University of Twente Student Theses
Defending against Access Pattern Attacks on Secure Range Query Schemes
Boot, J.J.F. (2020) Defending against Access Pattern Attacks on Secure Range Query Schemes.
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| Abstract: | Secure range query schemes make it possible to encrypt data while still being able to execute range queries on the data. However, attacks exist on these schemes which require only access pattern leakage in order to reveal plaintexts. To make these schemes more secure, we obfuscate the access pattern by adding false positives. We tested this against state-of-the-art attacks to show the effectiveness of the measure. Since securing these schemes is inherently a trade-off between performance (in terms of communication overhead in this example), security (in terms of success rate of existing attack) and functionality (in terms of accuracy of the returned results), the experiments focus on these aspects to provide insight in the trade-offs between these factors. We provide a novel protocol (Local Indexed Search - LIS) using a local index which costs performance in order to make sure the only leakage is indeed the access pattern leakage. The results are open to interpretation; it takes at maximum 3.30 times the communication overhead to get at an acceptable security level (between 0.4 and 0.5 maximum symmetric error). It depends on the application context what the right trade-off is between security and performance. |
| Item Type: | Essay (Master) |
| Faculty: | EEMCS: Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science |
| Subject: | 54 computer science |
| Programme: | Computer Science MSc (60300) |
| Link to this item: | https://purl.utwente.nl/essays/84388 |
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